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PETER M. GERHART 
THE SUPREME COURT AND 
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: 
THE (NEAR) TRIUMPH OF 
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 
Since the Sherman Act was passed in 1890, 1 the Supreme Court 
has struggled to find an appropriate analytical and IIJ,ethodological 
framework for applying the federal antitrust laws. For a while, it 
appeared as if the Court might succeed. In a series of six cases since 
197 5, 2 the Court seemed to be moving toward a comprehensive, 
integrated antitrust methodology based on economic analysis and 
_largely following the writing of Chicago school scholars such 
as Robert Bork3 and Richard Posner. 4 Last Term, however, in 
Arizona v. Maricopa Cou11ty Medical Society/ the Court missed a 
Peter M. Gerhart is Professor of Law, Olfio State University College of Law. 
I 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1980). 
2 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 
435 U.S. 679 (1978); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 
U.S. I (1979); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979); and Catalano, Inc. v. Target 
Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980). 
3 BORK, THE A.vnTRIJST PARADOX (1978); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: 
Price-Fixi11g a11d Market Divisio11 (pts. 1-2), 74 YALE LJ- 775 (1965); 75 YALE LJ- 373 
(1966). 
4 POSNER, A.VTITRIJST LAW: A."' ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 147-67 (1967); POSNER & 
EASTERBROOK, ANTITRIJST (2d ed. 1981). See also Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and 
Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L REV. 263 (1981); Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. 
CHI. L REV. 886 (1981). 
5 102 S. Ct_. 2466 (1982). 
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significant opportunity to complete its methodological framevvork, 
and in doing so, made antitrust analysis once again confused and 
haphazard. 
This development is unfortunate. There is a central analytical 
model underlying the antitrust laws, and the Supreme Court has a 
special responsibility to identify and to articulate that model in 
order to increase the coherence, rationality, and predictability of 
antitrust analysis. Maricopa provided the Court with a splendid 
opportunity to do so, and the Court's failure to capitalize on that 
opportunity is dispiriting, even though the plurality decision may 
be short-lived. 
I. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 
Sound antitrust analysis must address two interrelated 
tasks. The first task is substantive: to identify accurately legislative 
purposes of the antitrust laws. This is difficult enough, but it is 
complicated by a second, procedural task: to find an appropriate 
balance between certainty and fidelity to legislative purpose and to 
fashion rules of conduct that are reasonably clear, precise, and 
easily applicable without sacrificing substantive antitrust values. 
Because the search for an accurate definition of antitrust values 
takes place in a legal system that promotes clarity, precision, and 
ease of applicability, the tensions between fidelity and certainty are 
great, creating the danger, evident in the history of antitrust doc-
trine, that more weight will be given to promoting certainty than is 
warranted. 
Prior to 1l1aricopa, the Supreme Court had begun to embrace two 
postulates suggested by Chicago school scholars that would mini-
mize the conflicts between the goals of certainty and fidelity. The 
first postulate, one advocated by Robert Bork as early as 1965, 6 is to 
restore the per se rule as a component of substantive antitrust anal-
ysis. This postulate is of immeasurable importance. V\lhen per se 
rules are applicable, issues of the purpose and effect of a person's 
conduct are irrelevant. Almost since their inception, however, the 
per se rules have been a source of mystery and misunderstanding. 
Per se rules were often thought of as if they had self-executing 
6 Bork, Tbe Rule of Reaso11 a11d tbc Per Sc Coucept: Price Fixi11g and Market Divisio11, 74 Y,\LE 
L.J. 77 5 (1965). 
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applicability to easily recognizable conduct, or as literal statements 
whose primary function was to add simplicity and certainty to 
antitrust law. As a result, antitrust analysis was deflected from a 
consideration of underlying substantive policies to a largely se-
mantic effort to "characterize" conduct, and courts have had inordi-
nate difficulty making and explaining decisions to apply per se 
rules. 
The postulate that the Supreme Court appeared to embrace prior 
to Maricopa would restore the original conception of the scope and 
role of the per se rules-one that views the rules as a summation of 
substantive antitrust policy and hence to be applied only after anal-
ysis of policy considerations. Were this postulate fully accepted it 
would be significant. It would mean that decisions to apply a per se 
rule must be based on the substantive policies of the Sherman Act, 
rather than on linguistic compartmentalization, requiring courts to 
examine and explain the substantive policies, and thus enlivening 
antitrust analysis with new substantive vigor. 
A second postulate of the Chicago school writers-a reorienta-
tion of substantive antitrust policy around the consumer welfare 
model-was also endorsed by the pre-Maricopa Supreme Court. 
The Court said that the only relevant question in evaluating a 
restraint of trade is whether the restraint promotes or suppresses 
competition. 7 By implication, "competition" is not to be viewed 
necessarily as a process of independence and rivalry, but as the 
outcome of a process. The "promote competition" standard is 
meant to focus on whether business activity promotes consumer 
welfare by increasing productive and allocative efficiency, and it is 
to be guided by economic analysis. 8 
Were this develQprnent continued, it, too, would be immensely 
significant. The promote/suppress standard is an important and 
relatively objective synthesizing principle that allows antitrust anal-
ysis to cut through overlapping verbal categories to a realistic ap-
praisal of the possibility that business conduct will promote 
efficiency. Indeed, the "promote competition" standard is a simpli-
fying and clarifying coricept. As the Supreme Court appeared to 
recognize, combinations in restraint of trade possibly promote corn-
petition under three circumstances-when there is integration to 
7 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978). 
8 The consumer welfare model is discussed in the text accompanying notes 48-52 infra. 
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efficiency; when the combination overcomes a problem of exter-
nalities such as the free-rider problem; and when a combination 
reduces transaction costs. These three circumstances define the 
range of cases not covered by a per se rule. 
II. THE FIRST POSTULATE: THE ROLE OF PER SE RULES 
Despite their many benefits, per se rules have been an inade-
quate component of antitrust analysis, because no coherent theory 
has existed for determining when the rules were to be applied. This 
significant deficiency reflects confusion about the role of per se 
rules and misunderstanding of the substantive antitrust policy that 
underlies the rules. 
Per se rules, which are ~aid to be applicable to price fixing, 
division of markets, horizontal group boycotts, and tying agree-
ments, encapsulate a conclusion that identified conduct is so inher-
ently anticompetitive or so devoid of redeeming virtues that the 
conduct is unlawful in and of itself, without regard to the effect of 
the conduct or the purpose of those engaging in it. 9 Under per se 
rules, both anticompetitive purpose and anticompetitive effect are 
conclusively presumed to exist once the forbidden conduct is 
proven, so that proof of the forbidden conduct is by itself proof of 
an antitrust violation. In contrast, if a per se rule is not applied, the 
case must be tried under the rule of reason, which requires the 
plaintiff to prove the anticompetitive purpose or effect of the con-
duct and which permits the defendant to prove that the conduct 
achieves legitimate competitive goals. 10 
9 The classic summary of per se rules is from Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 
U.S. I, 5 (1958): "[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their perni-
cious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be 
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have 
caused or the business excuse for their use .... Among the practices which the courts have 
heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing, ... division of 
markets, ... group boycotts, ... and tying arrangements" (citations omitted). There are 
many scholarly discussions of the scope and function of per se rules, e.g., Elman, "Petrified 
Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 625 (1966); Loevinger, The Rule of 
Reason i11 Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 23 (1964); von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-an 
Emerging Philosopby of Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 569 (I 964); Rahl, Per Se Rules and 
Boycotts under tbe Shennan Act: Some Reflectiom on the Klor's Case, 45 VA. L. REV. 1165 (1959); 
Rahl, Price Competition and tbe Price Fixing Rules-Preface 011d Perspectives, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 
137 (1962); Comment, Tbe Per Se Illegality of Price-Fixing-Sans Power, Purpose or Effect, 19 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 837 (1952); KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 142-44 (1959). 
10 E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Chicago Board of Trade v. 
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
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Because they simplify antitrust doctrine, per se rules often pro-
mote such important enforcement goals as ease of application, de-
terrence, and predictability. 11 The certainty provided by the rules, 
however, is often illusory. Although the per se rules tell a court that 
issues of purpose and effect are irrelevant to a case in which the rule 
is applied, no decision to apply a per se rule can be made until after 
analysis, however rudimentary, of whether the rule should be ap-
plied. In all but the easiest cases, the determination whether to 
apply the rule has been troublesome, largely because few coherent, 
consistent standards have existed for making that determination. 
Although the per se rules are usually stated as if they were self-
executing, they are not. 12 The per se rule covering tying arrange-
ments, for example, is not applied until several issues of purpose 
and effect are determined. 13 The per se price-fixing rule is strong 
but not omnipotent: when independent firms agree to reduce com-
petitign between themselves, without doing more, their conduct is 
doubtless unlawful, 14 but not all conduct that might literally or 
11 E.g.; Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958): "This principle of per se 
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman 
Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an 
incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the 
industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a 
particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when under-
taken." 
12 A similar point is made in Bork, The Rule of Reason and the PerSe Concept: Price-Fixing a11d 
Market Divisio11, 74 YALEL.J. 775, 777 (1965): "The current shibboleth of per se illegality in 
existing law conveys a sense of certainty, even of automaticity, which is delusive. The per se 
concept does not accurately describe the law relating to agreements eliminating competition 
as it is, as it has been, or as it ever can be. Alongside cases announcing a sweeping per se 
formulation of the law there has always existed a line of cases refusing to apply it. Doubtless 
some of the cases in the latter group were wrongly decided, but it would be naive to write 
them all off as simply incorrect or aberrational. The persistent refusal of courts to honor the 
literal terms of the per se rules against price-fixing and market-division agreements demon-
strates a deep-seated though somewhat inarticulate sense that those rules, as usually stated, 
are inadequate." 
13 The per se rule is applied only if the seller is selling two separate products, the tying 
product is unique or has market power, and a not insubstantial amount of commerce in the 
tied product is foreclosed. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 
495 (1969) (Fort11er /);United S"tates Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 
(1977) (Fortner//). Moreover, the per se rule.is not applied if the combined selling of two 
products is essential to the seller's goodwill. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 
F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). 
14 The price-fixing per se rule applies to agreements between unintegrated competitors 
concerning credit terms, Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); contrac-
tual terms with customers, Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 
(I 930) (arbitration clauses), United States v. First National Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (I 930) 
(completion of existing contracts and cash deposits); discounts, United States v. United 
Liquors Corp., 149 F. Supp. 609 (W.O. Tenn. 1956), aff'dpercuriam, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); 
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even analogically be characterized as price fixing is price fixing 
subject to the per se rule. 15 Similarly, the per se rule applicable to 
horizontal group boycotts is so riddled with exceptions that it is 
difficult to restate the rule in a meaningful way. 16 
The per se rules became defective because they lost touch with 
the substantive policy that prompted their formulation. As a result, 
the characterization process-the process of determining whether 
the conduct challenged in a lawsuit should be characterized as, for 
example, price fixing subject to the per se rule-is often guided by 
analytical methods that bear no relationship to relevant substantive 
criteria. 17 Even those cases that have correctly avoided the heavy 
hand of the per se rules-and there are many 18-have been forced 
United States v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 182 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); 
markups, Food and Grocery Bureau, Inc. v. United States, 139 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1943); 
lraUe-in allowances and list prices, Plymouth Deaiers 1 Ass'n v. UniLed Slales, 279 F.2d 128 
(9th Cir. 1960); and trading stamps, United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, Inc., 285 F.2d 
688 (7th Cir. 1961). It applies to agreements between unintegrated competitors not to adver-
tise, United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, Inc. 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961); agreements 
to establish uniform costs on which prices can be based, California Retail Grocers & Mer-
chants Ass'n, Ltd. v. United States, !39 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1943); and agreement on terms of 
purchase, National JVIacaroni Mfgs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965). 
15 E.g., Broadcast Music Industries, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. I 
(1979); Evans v. S. S. Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1184 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 
(1977); United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); United States v. 
Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Department of Justice, Busi-
ness Review Letter, August 5, 1980 (granting clearance to cooperative activity with an 
impact on prices). 
The per se rule against vertical price fixing is counterbalanced by the Colgate doctrine, 
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), which permits some refusals to deal 
with price cutters, and by the doctrine that a seller may determine the prices at which his 
agents or legitimate consignees sell. Marty's Floor Covering Co., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 604 
F. 2d 266 (4th Cir. 1979). 
16 Attempts to synthesize the group boycott cases are legion. E.g., SCLLIVA01, I-lA:--iDBOOK 
OF THE LAW OF A:--iTITRCST, 229-59 (1977); Bauer, Per Se lllegality of Concerted Refusals to 
Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1979); McCormick, Group 
Roycoll.r-Per Se or Not Per Se, That Is the Question, 7 SETO"I I-I ALL L REV. 703 (I 976); Barber, 
Rtfusals to Deal under the Federal Antitmst Laws, 103 U. PA. L REV. 847 (1955). 
17 Without workable criteria for applying the per se rules, antitrust litigation often centers 
on an elaborate semantic game: for example, a court or advocate wishing to avoid the per se 
rule against group boycotts must argue either that the conduct is not a boycott (when in fact 
it is) or that it is a boycott, but not the type of boycott that is subject to the per se rule. E.g., 
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("We hold that the NFL 
player draft is not properly characterized as a 'group boycott'-at least not the type of 
boycott that traditionally has been held illegal per se"). Neither approach is satisfactory 
unless the classification decision is based on substantive policy. 
18 E.g., Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F. 2d 119 (8th 
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 
(D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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to so torture the relevant doctrine as to make the application of 
antitrust law appear whimsical, 19 even when it would not be were it 
freed from the semantic grip of the per se rules. In short, without a 
theory for deteqpining when the per se rules are to be applied-
that -is, without attention to the substantive policy that underlies 
the rules-the rules became formless and opaque. 
One of the most ignominious antitrust cases, United States v. 
Topco Associates Inc., 20 is illustrative. There, the Court applied the 
per se rule that prohibits division of territories between sellers of 
different brands (restraints on interbrand competition)21 to an 
agreement in which grocery store members of a joint buying 
agency bound themselves to sell the agency's merchandise (a single 
brand) in assigned, closed territories (which restrains only in-
trabrand competition). Despite the district court's thorough rule of 
reason analysis upholding the restraint, 22 the Supreme Court es-
chewed any analysis, even analysis to determine whether the per se 
rule should be applied. The restraint was classified as a horizontal 
restraint and the Court refused to determine whether the restraint 
was different from those horizontal restraints subject to the per se 
rule. 23 The Court should not have applied the per se rule at all. 
Unlike horizontal interbrand restraints subject to the per se rule, 
these "horizontal" restraints were primarily intrabrand restraints 
and were ancillary to the integration of grocery stores in a joint 
19 Lo"•er federal courts have been ingenious in creating formulas to blunt the force of 
literal per se rules. Some courts have established prerequisites for a per se rule. Neeld v. 
National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1299 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979) ("per se rules have only 
been applied in the face of arguably demonstrable anticompetitiveness"); Gough v. Rossmoor 
Corp., 585 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. dmied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Hatley v. American 
Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 653 (5th Cir. 1977) (per se rule not applied in absence of 
"minimal indicia of anti-competitive purpose or effect"). Still other courts avoid the per se 
rules by recharacterizing the conduct, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Diversified Packag-
ing, 549 F.2d 368, 379 (5th Cir. 1977) ("We deal here not with tie-ins, whose adverse effects 
and lack of redeeming virtue are by now quite familiar, but instead with approved source 
requirements"). Other courts practice benign neglect of per se rules, e.g., Eliason Corp. v. 
National Sanitation Foundation, 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1980). 
20 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
21 E.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (195 I); Addyston Pipe 
and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), aff'g, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). 
22 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970), rev'd, 405 
u.s. 596 (1972). 
23 The Court's attempt to rely on United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), as a 
case "on all fours with this case," 405 U.S. 609, is unpersuasive. In Sealy, where the 
territorial restraints accompanied resale price maintenance, the Court had expressly refused 
to determine the legality of intrabrand territorial restraints standing alone. 388 U.S. at 356. 
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buying agency, providing a justification that should have taken the 
. ... h I 7 _,_ restramts out or t e per se ru e.-· 
In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Cominema! T. 11., Inc. 
v. GTE Sylvania, li7c. 25 that nonprice intrabrand restraints imposed 
vertically are to be judged under the rule of reason, Topco should be 
considered as an endangered species, 26 despite the Supreme Court's 
dogged attempts to retain it. 27 But the Topco outcome-which 
could have been justified under an appropriate analysis 28-is less 
troublesome than the Court's perversion of the per se rules. Virtu-
ally every statement concerning the per se rules that the majority 
made in Topco is antithetical to sound antitrust analysis. 29 
24 For a fuller discussion of this po'int, see BORIC, THE A:-<TITRCST PARADOX, 276-77 
(1978). 
25 433 u.s. 36 (1977). 
26 Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwim1 Overruled, 1977 SCPREME COCRT HEVTEW 171 (1977); 
Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the S)'lvania Decision, 45 U. 
CHI. L. REv. I, 6-10 (1977); Louis, Restrai11ts Ancillary to Joint Vmtures and Licensing Agree-
mwts: Do Seal)' and Topco Logical!)' Survive S)'lvania and BMI? 66 VA. L. REV. 879 (1980). 
27 E.g., Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-5R nn.27-2R 
(1977); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (1982). 
28 Although Topco members were free to expand into one another's territory if they did 
not use the profitable Topco brand, the Topco brand may have been so integrated into their 
operations that the members would not expand territories without it. If that were true, the 
territorial exclusivity for the Topco brand eliminated interbrand as well as intra brand com-
petition, and that adverse competitive effect might have outweighed the procompetitive 
effect of the strong Topco brand. Although the findings of the district court undercut this 
theory (see finding 45, 319 F. Supp. at 1037), the government's brief plausibly challenged 
that finding. Brief for the United States 30-33. 
29 According to Justice Marshall, "(w]hether or not we would decide this case the same 
way under the rule of reason used by the District Court is irrelevant," 405 U.S, at 609. This 
suggests that cases might be decided differently under the rule of reason than under per se 
rules, a nonsensical suggestion that one of the rules is irrational. Justice Burger expressed the 
better view in his dissent: "per se rules that have been developed are ... directed to the 
protection of the public welfare; they are complementary to, and in no way inconsistent 
with, the rule of reason." 405 U.S. 621. Justice Marshall also misperceived the relationship 
between the Court and Congress, "Should Congress," he said, "ultimately determine that 
predictability is unimportant in this area of the law, it can, of course, make per sc rules 
inapplicable in some or all cases, and leave courts free to ramble through the wilds of 
economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach." 405 U.S. 609-10 n.IO. When 
Congress passed the Sherman Act, however, it did not legislate predictability as a weightier 
value than fidelity, nor did it explicitly legislate any per se rules, much less the rule applied 
by the Topco majority. 
Justice Blaclunun, who found the Topco result "anomalous" because it would "tend to 
stultify Topco members' competition with the great and larger chains," nonetheless con-
curred in the result on the mistaken theory that "(t]he per se rule ... now appears to be so 
firmly established by the Court that, at this late elate, I could not oppose it." 405 U.S. at 
612-13. The per se rule, however, had never been firmly established as to territorial in-
trabrand restraints. Paradoxically, Justice Blaclunun later joined the majority in overturning 
the established per se rule applicable to vertical non price restraints. Continental TV., lnc. 
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
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Most significantly, the existence of a per se rule should not, and 
logjcally cannot, preclude a court from determining whether the 
peF se rule should be applied. The applicability of the per se rule is 
not an issue that is foreclosed by the existence of a per se rule. If the 
characteristics of a case are so different from previous per se cases 
that the substantive policy embodied in the per se rule is no longer 
applicable, the rule should not be applied. It makes little sense to 
invoke the per se rule, as Topco did, solely because analysis under 
the rule of reas~n is complicated. 30 Whether the per se rule is 
applicable is not complicated or beyond judicial capacities; that 
issue should rarely be decided on the basis of the difficulty of the 
analysis once the rule of reason is invoked. If the per se rule is 
inapplicable, it is because the conduct is possibly procompetitive, 
and, under most circumstances, any rational attempt to assess com-
" petitive effects would be better than invoking a per se rule that, by 
ignoring procompetitive effects, will inevitably lead to incorrect 
results. 
Concededly, per se rules rest in part on a judgment that more 
extensive analysis would not produce a sufficiently more accurate 
assessment of competitive effects to outweigh the costs of the analy-
sis, including both monetary costs and the cost of uncertainty. 31 A 
per se rule can therefore be applied whenever a court determines 
that alternate analysis is unduly costly. The existence of the per se 
rule, however, does not relieve the court from evaluating the costs 
and benefits of a more detailed analysis in the case before it. More-
over, although there are undoubtedly situations in which the al-
leged redeeming virtues of restraints of trade are incapable of being 
30 As Chief Justice Burger said in his Topco dissent: "The issues presented by the antitrust 
cases reaching this Court are rarely simple to resolve under the rule of reason; they do indeed 
frequently require us to make difficult economic determinations. We should not for that 
reason alone, however, be overly zealous in formulating new per se rules, for an excess of zeal 
in that regard is both contrary to the policy of the Sherman Act and detrimental to the 
welfare of consumers generally." 405 U.S. at 624. 
31 E.g., United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J ., dissent-
ing): "Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness. They are justified on the assump-
tion that the gains from imposition of the rule will far outweigh the losses and that significant 
administrative advantages will result. In other words, the potential competitive harm plus 
the administrative cost of determining in what particular situations the practice may be 
harmful must far outweigh the benefits that may result. If the potential benefits in the 
aggregate are outweighed to this degree, then they are simply not worth identifying in 
individual cases"). Similar views are expressed in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.l6 (1977) and KAYSE;\1 & Tt.:R;-.IER, A;\ITITRL:ST POLICY, 142-44 
(1959). 
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identified and evaluated efficiently, 32 most forms of procompetitive 
collaboration can be identified and evaluated without undue cost. 33 
In those cases, a per se rule should not be applied until the appro-
priate analysis has been completed. 
The Court's pre-J11aricopa opinions began to reflect a per se rule 
that was attuned more to fidelity to antitrust values than to cer-
tainty and thus that was in touch with the substantive policy under-
lying the per se rules. When it reversed the per se rule applicable to 
nonprice vertical restraints, the Court referred to the "demanding 
standards" 34 for establishing a per se rule, and noted that although 
the per se rules provide procedural advantages, "those advantages 
are not sufficient in themselves to justify the creation of per se 
rules. If it were otherwise, all of antitrust law ·would be reduced to 
per se rules, thus introducing an unintended and undesirable rigid-
ity in the law. "35 Later, when it refused to apply the per se price-
fixing rule to the joint licensing of copyright rights, the Court noted 
that the "easy labels [of per se rules] do not always supply ready 
ansvvers" 36 and spoke of the importance of examining the substan-
tive policies underlying the rules: 37 
As generally used in the antitrust field, "price fixing" is a 
shorthand \vay of describing certain categories of business be-
havior to which the per se rule has been held applicable. The 
Court of Appeals' literal approach [in applying the per se rule] 
does not alone establish that this particular practice is one of 
those types or that it is "plainly anticompetitive and very likely 
without redeeming virtue." Literalness is overly simplistic and 
often overbroad. VVhen two partners set the price of their goods 
or services they are literally "price fixing," but they are not per 
se in violation of the Sherman Act .... Thus, it is necessary to 
characterize the challenged conduct as falling within or without 
the category of behavior to which we apply the label "per se 
price fixing." That will often, but not always, be a simple mat-
ter. 
32 This may be true, for e;;ample, of the claim that price fixing between unintegrated 
competitors leads to lower capital costs by reducing uncertainty. Other examples of theoreti-
cally procompetitive price fixing are in SCHERER, l0iDL:STRlAL 0RGA011ZATI001 ECOc-iOMJCS 
509 (1980), and Mason, 1Harket Power and Busi11ess Conduct: Some Commenls, -t6 A/11. ECON. 
REV. 471-81 (1956). 
33 See text accompanying notes 62-115 infra. 
l-1 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., -t33 U.S. 36, 50 (1977). 
u !d., n.16. 
36 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., +IJ U.S. 1, 8 (1979). 
37 ld. at 9. 
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More important, although this aspect of the case is generally 
overlooked, in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United 
States/ 8 the Court made it clear that applying a per se rule is a 
matter of substantive policy. At issue in Professional Engineers was an 
\
ethical canon of the National Society of Professional Engineers that 
prohibited competitive bidding by the Society's members. The 
Society asserted that the ethical canon was in the public interest, 
because competitive bidding would lead to unsafe or unethical 
practices. 39 1ts argument rested on a footnote to the Court's prior 
Goldfarb opinion that "[t]he public service aspect, and other features 
of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which 
could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in 
another context, be treated differently. "40 
The Court applied a per se rule, however, and refused to allow 
the Society to prove its assertion. Because Justice Stevens's major-
ity opinion repeatedly invoked the term "Rule of Reason," and 
because the rule of reason and per se rules are often thought to be 
separate analytical categories, some have believed that Professional 
Engineers was decided under traditional rule of reason analysis. 41 To 
Justice Stevens, however, the "Rule of Reason" contains the analy-
sis necessary to decide whether to apply the per se rule and thus 
covers all antitrust cases. Justice Stevens's "Rule of Reason" is not a 
rule of reasonableness, but a rule having to do with reasonsY All 
38 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
39 The Court summarized the defense as follows: "[T]he Society averred that the standard 
set out in the Code of Ethics was reasonable because competition among professional en-
gineers was contrary to the public interest. It was averred that it would be cheaper and easier 
for an engineer 'to design and specify inefficient and unnecessarily expensive structures and 
methods of construction.' Accordingly, competitive pressure to offer engineering services at 
the lowest possible price would adversely affect the quality of engineering. Moreover, the 
practice of awarding engineering contracts to the lowest bidder, regardless of quality, would 
be dangerous to the public health, safety and welfare. For these reasons, the Society claimed 
that its Code of Ethics was not an 'unreasonable restraint of interstate trade or commerce.' " 
435 U.S. at 684-85 (footnotes omitted). 
40 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 788-89 n.l7 (1975). 
41 Justice Blaclunun made this assumption in his concurring opinion. 435 U.S. at 700. See 
also Redlich, The Burger Court and the Per Se Rule, 44 ALBA:-.IY L. REV. I, 36 (1979), and 
Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Dejini11g the Scope of Exemptions, Expandi11g 
Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 265, 322-23 (1979). 
42 According to Justice Stevens, "the Rule [of Reason] does not open the field of antitrust 
inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of 
reason.'~ 435 U.S. at 688. Rather, "[t]o evaluate [defendants'] argument it is necessary to 
identify the contours of the Rule of Reason and to discuss its application to the kind of 
justification asserted by [defendants]." 435 U.S. at 687. After considering these jus-
tifications, the Court dismissed them because they "are not reasons that satisfy the Rule." ld. 
at 694. 
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restraints must be supported by reasons (i.e., justifications) that are 
legally acceptable; the "Rule of Reason" determines which reasons 
are legally acceptable and which are not. In effect, the decision in 
Professional Engineers to disallow defendants' asserted reason for 
their restraint is a decision, under Justice Stevens's "Rule of Rea-
son," to apply the per se rule, 43 one that is based on the substantive 
policy of the antitrust laws. 
Under these pre-Maricopa cases, per se analysis functions as the 
keystone of antitrust analysis. A decision to apply a per se rule 
should be a decision that the conduct has no redeeming virtues, or 
at least none worth considering. Conversely, a decision not to apply 
a per se rule should reflect the substantive content of the rule. It 
should be based on a conclusion that the conducr in question has 
redeeming virtues that are worth trying to evaluate, and should 
thus identify the factors that are relevant in a more extended, fac-
tual analysis. These are substantive policy decisions and are not 
designed merely to simplify antitrust doctrine. 
Ill. THE SECOND POSTULATE: THE CONSUiviER 
\VELF/i,_RE l\10DEL 
The Supreme Court's characterization of the per se rules as 
substantive, not procedural, rules is important. Even more impor-
tant is that in its pre-A1aricopa cases the Court restored the original 
vision of policy-based per se rules by identifying the substantive 
policies that guide their application. 
The Court invoked the familiar promote/suppress standard from 
Chicago Board ofTrade44 as the unifying antitrust standard. 45 Under 
this standard, if a restraint arguably promotes competition, it is 
supported by reasons that require analysis of the net effect of the 
restraint. H, on the other hand, the only reason for the restraint is 
to suppress competition, it is supported by no acceptable reason 
and is therefore unlawful per se. 
43 Justice Stevens's notion that per se cases are a category of cases under the Hule of 
Heason has not been repeated by the Court. Indeed, when Justice Stevens wrote the 1l1aricopa 
opinion, note 5 supra, he did not capitalize "rule of reason." It is nonetheless clear that a court 
must examine the reasons advanced to justify a restraint before deciding in which category to 
place it. 
-H Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
45 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978). 
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At one level the promote/suppress standard appears paradoxical. 
If "competition" means business rivalry, then all restraints of trade 
suppress competition and should be unlawful under the standard. 
For example, when the seller of a business agrees not to compete 
with the buyer of the business, competition is suppressed in the 
sense that the restraint eliminates the potential rivalry of the seller. 
Hence, if competition is equated with rivalry, a literal 
interpretation of Professional Engineers might "call into question the 
classic ancillary restraints"46 or preclude a court from considering 
ethical or safety norms, even though the Supreme Court has said 
that those restraints are to be evaluated under the rule of reason. 47 
The explanation for this apparent paradox is that the Court uses 
the consumer welfare model articulated by Professor Bork48 to ap-
ply the promote/suppress standard. Under this model, competition 
is seen not as a process of rivalry but as a process that maximizes 
consumer welfare by maximizing both allocative and productive 
efficiency. Competition is thus promoted by increasing the 
efficiency of markets, even if a reduction in rivalry results. The 
promote/suppress standard thus permits rivalry to be restrained in 
order to maximize efficiency and consumer welfare. 
Although the Burger Court has not explicitly endorsed the con-
sumer welfare model, the promote/suppress standard and the 
Court's pre-Maricopa decisions are intelligible only if interpreted in 
the light of that model. Moreover, in those decisions the Court 
often used language suggestive of the consumer welfare model. For 
example, the Court cited Robert Bork's contention that the Sher-
man Act is a "consumer welfare prescription"49 and noted that "an 
antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would appear 
to lack any objective benchmarks. "50 Moreover, said the Court, 
antitrust analysis is to focus "directly on the challenged restraint's 
impact on competitive conditions"51 to determine "whether the 
practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost 
46 Robinson, Recmt Antitrust Developll;mts-1979, 80 COLIJM. L. REv. I, 17 (1980). 
47 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688, 696 (1978). 
48 BORK, THE fu"\ITITRUST PARADOX (1978). 
49 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). 
5° Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977). 
51 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). 
332 l"HE SUPrlEME COUP.'i REVIEW [1982 
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output. "52 The last 
phrase captures the central theme of the consumer welfare model: 
conduct that restricts output by reducing allocative efficiency is 
unlawful because it reduces consumer ·welfare. Conduct that in-
creases productive efficiency without a counterbalancing restriction 
of allocative efficiency is lawful because it promotes consumer \Vel-
fare. 
By interpreting the promote/suppress standard in the light of the 
consumer welfare model, the Court made the standard a potentially 
potent synthesizing principle. 
A. SUPPRESSING COMPETITION: THE POLICY UNDERLYING THE 
PER SE RULES 
In Professional Engineers, Justice Stevens identified the central sub-
stantive policy underlying the per se rules, linking that policy di-
rectly to the first case to use the term "per se," United States v. 
Socony- Vacuum Oil Co. 53 As stated by Justice Stevens, antitrust anal-
ysis "does not support a defense based on the assumption that 
competition itself is unreasonable,"S+ so the purpose of antitrust 
1 • "' 1 '1 1 L 1• r • .•. • • 
a.na1ys1s lS not to oec10e wnetuer a poilcy lavonng compennon JS 
in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an 
industry. Subject to exceptions defined by statute, that policy deci-
sion has been made by Congress. "55 Because competition is always 
in the public interest, antitrust analysis does not permit "inquiry 
into the reasonableness of the prices set by private agreement" or 
"argument that because of the special characteristics of a particular 
industry, monopolistic arrangements will better promote trade and 
commerce than competition. "56 Accordingly, the Society's attempt 
in Professional Engineers to justify its restraint "on the basis of the 
potential threat that competition poses to the public safety and the 
ethics of its profession is nothing less than a frontal assault on 
the basic policy of the Sherman Act, "57 providing no "reasons that 
5
' Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., +tl U.S. I, 19-20 
(I 979). 
;) 310 u.s. 150 (1940). 
54 435 U.S. at 696. 
55 !d. at 692. 
56 !d. at 689. 
57 !d. nt 695. 
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satisfy the Rule [of Reason]"58 and thus requiring no factual analy-
sts. 
I~ short, the per se rules wield their power because they express 
the substantive conclusion that restraints may not be justified by 
the argument that without the restraint the competitive process 
would be undesirable, destructive, or contrary to the public inter-
est. Under the consumer welfare model, restraints that are unable 
to improve efficiency cannot be justified on any other basis. 
Justice Stevens also clarified the Goldfarb footnote and the rele-
vance of the Society's argument that the professional aspects of 
engineering require less stringent analytical standards than are nor-
mal. The Court denied that the "cautionary footnote" of Goldfarb 
could "be read as fashioning a broad exemption under the Rule of 
Reason for learned professions. "59 Instead:60 
[W)e adhere to the view expressed in Goldfarb that, by their 
nature, professional services may differ significantly from other 
business services, and, accordingly, the nature of the competi-
tion in such services may vary. Ethical norms may serve to 
regulate and promote this competition, and thus fall within the 
Rule of Reason. But the Society's argument in this case is a far 
cry from such a position .... [W]e may assume that competition 
is not entirely conducive to ethical behavior, but that is not a 
reason, cognizable under the Sherman Act, for doing away with 
competition. 
In other words, special considerations relating to the professions 
might influence analysis under the rule of reason, but they do not 
affect analysis of whether to apply the rule of reason. Thus, when 
competitors "regulate and promote" competition by prohibiting un-
ethical practices, the rule of reason requires a court to consider 
whether aspects of the professions are relevant to "the nature of 
competition" within the profession. In contrast, a decision to apply 
a per se rule depends only upon examining the reasons advanced to 
justify a restraint to see if they are "cognizable under the Sherman 
Act,"61 and that examination is the same for professions as for other 
business. Because the defendants in Professional Engineers restrained 
competition and not unethical practices, a per se rule was applica-
58 !d. at 694. 
59 !d. at 696. 
60 !d. 
61 !d. 
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ble, and the rule's impact "\Vas not changed because the restraint 
involved a learned profession. 
B. PROMOTING COivlPETITION THROUGH TRADE RESTRAINTS 
Although the "suppress" side of the promote/suppress standard 
captures the central antitrust principle that consumer welfare is 
always in the public interest (unless Congress deems otherwise), 
the "promote" side of the standard is far more interesting and intri-
cate, in part because defendants generally will have the burden of 
proving that their restrictive agreements promote competition. 
Analysis of the three ways that trade restraints promote competi-
tion shows that the promote competition standard is an economics-
oriented theory aro~nd which an.titrust doctrine can be developed, 
predicted, and evaluated. 
1. Integration to efficiency. The predominant form of procompeti-
tive competitor collaboration-and the form that is easiest to recog-
nize and evaluate-is integration to efficiency. The law protects 
worthwhile integration by permitting restraints that are necessary 
to facilitate savings of resources or improvements of quality. This 
strain of tl1e market efficiency theme is pervasive, evident not only 
in the law applicable to mergers62 and joint ventures, 63 where it has 
long been recognized, but also in the la-w relating to tying arrange-
ments,64 group boycotts, 65 and price fixing. 66 
62 Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defmse: The Welfare Tradeojfs, 58 AM. Eco:-.~. REV. 
18, 21 (1968); BORK, THEA:-.ITITRCST PARADOX 198-201 (1978). 
63 E.g., Justice Department, A."JTITRCST GCIDE FOR 10JTER:-.JATJ001AL 0PERATl00JS 13 
(Jan. 26, 1977); Pitofsky, Joint Vmtares Under tbe Antitmsl Laws: Same Reflections 011 the 
Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 I-lARV. L. REv. 1007, 1014-16 (1969). 
64 E.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (package 
sale of two items substantially reduces seller's costs and is therefore not unlawful); Dehydrat-
ing Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 65 3 (lst Cir. 1961), ccrl. dwied, 368 U.S. 931 
(1961). 
65 E.g., Instant Delivery Corp. v. Cities Stores Co., 28+ F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Pa. 1968) 
(integrating delivery services of independent department stores and using one carrier is not 
an unlawful boycott); Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 225 F.2d 289 (2d 
Cir. 1955) (no conspiracy when one publisher establishes a distributor and all other pub-
lishers shift business to that distributor); Parmelee T ransp. Co. v. Keeshin, 144 F. Supp. 
480, 186 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. III. 1958, 1960), affd, 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir.), ccrt. denied, 368 
U.S. 944 (1961); Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 405 F. 
Supp. 99 (D. Hawaii 1975) (joint worlunan's compensation plan not unreasonable). 
66 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Evans v. S. S. Kresge 
Co., 544 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977). 
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Integration occurs when independent firms pool resources to 
achieve a task; integration results in efficiencies when it permits the 
firms to avoid costs or to improve quality; integration is worthwhile 
when firms could not otherwise achieve the efficiencies as quickly. 
When a restraint is ancillary to an integration that provides ef-
ficiencies not otherwise obtainable, a court must apply the rule of 
reason to determine whether the value of the market efficiency 
achieved by integration outweighs the adverse effect of the re-
straint. 
Two recent Supreme Court cases nicely illustrate the difference 
between restraints that are ancillary to integration and those that 
are not. 
Performing rights organizations like ASCAP and BMI were or-
ganized by composers to facilitate the enforcement of rights under 
the copyright laws. Both organizations hold nonexclusive licenses 
from copyright owners. They sublicense their rights to copyright 
users and distribute the proceeds to the copyright owners in accor-
dance with a schedule that reflects, among other things, the fre-
quency and nature of use of each copyrighted work. Both organiza-
tions refuse to sublicense individual works. They grant only 
blanket licenses that cover all works in which they have an interest. 
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 67 CBS 
challenged the blanket license policy. CBS did not claim that 
ASCAP and BMI agreed to any term of sale. CBS claimed instead 
that by establishing a price for its blanket license, each performing 
rights organization independently engaged in price fixing that is per 
se unlawful. 
The Supreme Court refused to apply a per se rule, finding that 
"the challenged practice may have redeeming competitive virtues 
and that the search for those values is not almost sure to be in 
vain. "68 More particularly, the blanket license "accompanies the 
integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unau-
thorized copyright use. "69 The blanket license "is a necessary con-
sequence of the integration necessary to achieve these efficiencies, 
67 441 u.s. 1, 20 (1979). 
68 441 U.S. at 13. 
69 /d. at 20. 
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and a necessary consequence of [a blanket] license is that its price 
must be established."70 Thus, the per se rule was inapplicable. 
In contrast, Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc. 71 involved competi-
tors coordinating, not integrating, their operations. The defen-
dants, competing beer distributors, had agreed to stop selling on 
credit. Although the per se rule had long been thought to outlaw 
agreements betw~en independent firms covering any aspect of 
price, 72 including agreements covering credit terms, 73 both the dis-
trict court74 and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals75 refused to 
apply the per se rule. The Ninth Circuit characterized the credit 
agreement as a nonprice agreement, akin to product standardiza-
tion, which "may actually enhance competition. "76 
In a brief per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed this 
derogation of the per se rule. 77 Holding that credit is an aspect of 
price, so that a horizontal agreement on credit terms is subject to a 
literal application of the per se rule, rhe Court also held that prior 
cases "foreclose both of the possible justifications"78 suggested by 
the Ninth Circuit. The argument that by reducing credit competi-
tion the defendants would induce new, procompetitive entry \vas 
said to be identical to ::Jro·ninQ that comoetitor.s shonld be Jllowed to 
- --- 0 - u 1 - - - -- - --
make entry attractive by agreeing to raise prices. The per se cases 
had rejected that argument. 79 Similarly, the argument that by re-
ducing credit competition the defendants might increase price visi-
bility and thus increase overall competition was unacceptable under 
the per se rule. "Any industrywide agreement on prices will result 
in a more accurate understanding of the terms offered by all parties 
70 ld. at 21. On remand, the court of appeals found the blanket license policy to be lawful 
under the rule of reason. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Soc'y of Cotnpos-
ers, Authors and Publishers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 100 S. CL. 1-191 
(I 98 I). 
71 4-+6 U.S. 643 (1980). 
72 See note 14 mpra. 
73 United States v. First National Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 4-J. (1930) (agreement to lease 
only to those making cash deposits). 
7
•
1 See 446 U.S. 643 (1980). 
75 605 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1979). 
76 ld. at I 099. 
77 446 U.S. at 648. 
78 !d. at 646. 
79 !d. at 649. 
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to the agreement"80 but, under the per se rules, no such agreement 
is permitted. As a result, the defendants' agreement to eliminate 
credit was unsupported by permissible reasons and was therefore 
unlawful per se. 
The Court's reasoning is sound. Catalano involved no integration 
offunctions, only coordination of operations. Moreover, the defen-
dants could not convincingly argue that their agreement integrated 
the market to make it operate more efficiendy. In short, no resource 
savings counterbalanced the loss of competition flowing from the 
restraint, and the restraint was therefore per se unlawful. 
2. Externalities,Jree-riders, and optimal investment. The second way 
in which trade restraints may increase market efficiency is by over-
coming misallocation of resources caused by externalities-the 
costs and benefits of economic activity that are not reflected in 
market prices. 81 Investment decisions made in the market will 
reflect consumer welfare as long as all social costs and benefits of 
the activity are included in market prices; all investments that con-
sumers are willing to pay for, but only those investments, will be 
generated by the market. As a result, in a competitive system it is 
ordinarily presumed that market forces, not government or private 
restraints, should govern investment decisions. 
The problem of externalities, however, may mean that invest-
ment decisions reached through market mechanisms are inappro-
priate. When the value of commercial activity can be appropriated 
by consumers (and competitors) without payment, underinvest-
ment in that activity is likely because the rewards of investment are 
reduced. This is true, for example, for so-called public goods82 -
goods such as national defense that benefit even those who do not 
pay for them. Conversely, when economic activity imposes costs 
on the public or competitors that are not included in market prices, 
too much investment may take place. Under such circumstances, 
intervention in the market to overcome the resource misallocation 
caused by externalities may increase market efficiency and thus be 
procompetitive. 
80 ld. 
81 E.g., MIS HAN, EcONOMICS FOR SOCIAL DECISIONS 85-111 (1975); Bator, The Auatomy 
of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. EcoN. 351 (1958). 
81 E.g., Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 387 
(1954); Oakland, Public Goods, Pe1ject Competitiou, m1d Unde1productioll, 82]. PoL Eco:'>!. 927 
(1974). 
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The problem of externalities is an important integrating con-
cept in the la-vvs relating to the competitive system. It serves as a 
justification for environmental and ~afety regu1ation83 and as the 
primary economic support for the prohibition on copying and imi-
tation found in the law of copyrights, 84 patents, 85 and unfair com-
petition. 86 In antitrust, the free-rider problem is the externality that 
has attracted the most attention. 87 It is thus significant that the 
Supreme Court accepted the free-rider argument as a legitimate 
justification for nonprice vertical restraints. 88 Non price vertical re-
straints may increase investment in services provided by dealers 
and distributors, and thus increase market efficiency, by assuring 
that consumers and competitors will not benefit from such invest-
ment without paying for it. 
The problem of externalities, however, is not limited to vertical 
distribution restraints. For example, when Justice Stevens analyzed 
the venerable Mitchell v. ReyJlold.r89 in Professional Engineers, 90 he 
showed that concern for the free-rider problem is a long-standing 
antitrust theme. Jvfiichel! v. Reynolds approved a noncornpetition 
agreement given by the seller of a business-a ci::~ssic restraint of 
trade imposed to overcome a free-rider problem. A perso:n \vho 
sells his business is a potential free-rider on the value of the good-
will transferred with the business, because his established business 
relationships and accumulated know-how permit him to appropri-
ate inexpensively the customer goodwill and business opportunities 
he transferred to the new owner. The law therefore permits the 
seller to agree not to compete with the buyer of the business in 
83 Breyer, Aualyziug Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Lcss Restricth;c Altemati"ues, aud Reform, 
92 I-IARV. L. REV. 549, 555 (1979). 
34 Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Stti!~Y of Copyright in Boo/IS, Photocopies, and 
Computer Programs, 84 l-IARV. L. REV. 281 (1970). 
115 l'dachlup, .rln Economic Review oftbe Patmt System, Study No. 15 of the Subcommittee on 
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 85th 
Con g., 2d Sess. (1958); Arrow, Economic 'vl'elfare and the Allocation of Resources for hiVmtion, in 
THE RATE Ai-lD DIRECT!Oi-l OF l01VE0/TIVE ACTIVITY (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search) 617 (1982); Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & Eco01. 12 
(1969); Kitch, Tbe Nature and Functiou of tbe Patmt System, 20 J.L. & Eco01. 265 (1977). 
86 KITCH & PERLMA01, LEGAL REGL"LATI001 OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 2d ed., 48-53 
(1979); International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
37 E.g., POS0/ER, ANTITRL"ST LAW, 147-67 (1976). 
88 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977). 
119 1 P. Wms. 181,24 Eng. Rep. 347 (ch. 1711). 
90 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978). 
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order to overcome this free-rider possibility and protect the value of 
the business being transferred. Such a restriction, if reasonable, is 
upheld because "the long-run benefit of enhancing the marketabil-
ity of the business itself-and thereby providing incentives to de-
velop such an enterprise-outweighed the temporary and limited 
loss of competition. "91 
Free-rider problems also underlie permissive treatment in some 
price-fixing and boycott cases. 92 For example, restrictions on hiring 
by organized athletic teams may be- justified as necessary to avoid 
the possibility that one team will impose costs-in the form of 
decreased reputation93 or safety94-on the other teams without hav-
ing to compensate for those costs. 
Identifying the problem of externalities as a justification for trade 
restraints shows the relationship between cases previously thought 
to be unrelated. The externalities problem is not, however, an 
acceptable justification in every antitrust context, 95 so care must be 
taken in its application. Courts should focus their analysis of partic-
ular cases on whether circumstances exist that give rise to a genuine 
problem of externalities; whether the investment induced or saved 
by the restraint is significant enough to ourvveigh the restrictive 
91 435 U.S. at 688-89. 
92 Bork, The Rule of Reaso11 a11d the Per Se Co11cept: Price-Fixi11g a11d Market Divisio11, 75 YALE 
L.J. 373, 457-64 (1966) (analyzing United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 
!53 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) and United States v. Nationwide Trailer Rental System, Inc., !56 F. 
Supp. 800 (D. Kans. 1957, aJJ'd, 355 U.S. 10 (1957)). See also Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild 
Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978) (price 
restrictions on sales outside assigned territories should be treated as territorial restrictions). 
93 Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Manok 
v. Southeast Dist. Bowling Ass'n, 306 F. Supp. 1215 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (not a violation to 
suspend plaintiff, after a hearing, for fraudulent activities intended to manipulate handicaps). 
Co11tra, Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1265 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
94 Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979) (prohibition on hiring 
one-eyed hockey player is justified). See also Florists' Nationwide Tel. Delivery Network v. 
Florists' Tel. Delivery Ass'n, 371 F.2d 263 (7th Cir.), cert. de11ied, 387 U.S. 909 (1967) 
(restrictions on dealing between florists in integrated network may be necessary to prevent 
cream skimming). The court appears to have misused the free-rider analysis in Yoder Bros., 
Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
1094 (1977) (restrictions on distribution of unique plant cuttings per se unlawful by analogy 
to Fashio11 Origi11ators' Guild). 
95 E.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (secondary 
boycott not justified to overcome free-riding-style piracy). Compare Cheney Bros. v. Doris· 
Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929) (copying fabric designs is not unfair competition). The 
author's view that the free-rider problem does not explain or justify resale price maintenance 
is articulated in Gerhart, The "Competitive Advalltages" Expla11atio11 for lntrabra11d Restraillfs: A11 
A11titr11St A11alysis, 1981 DtJKE L.J. 417 (198 1). 
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features of the restraint; and whether the externalities can be over-
come by any less restrictive means. 
C. REDUCING TRANSACTION COSTS 
Collaborative conduct may also increase market efficiency by 
reducing transaction costs-the costs of matching buyers and 
sellers. 96 Unlike the model of pure competition, 97 in real markets 
information is not ubiquitous or costless. It is costly to search for 
goods and for information about goods, to bargain over terms of 
sale, and to enforce bargains. Uncertainty is pervasive, and mea-
sures to reduce uncertainty or control risks are costly. As a result, 
market output is increased when restraints reduce information or 
bargaining costs, overcome impediments to the flow of information 
and efficient bargaining, or reduce uncertainty. Several examples of 
procompetitive restraints that reduce transaction costs are illus-
trative. 
1. Integration to reduce bmgaining costs. Transaction costs are re-
duced, of course, ·when integration of activities eliminates duplicate 
barg;~ining efforts and thus reduces the cost of bargaining, as in 
Broadcast 1Husic98 and several cases upholding joint sales agencies. 99 
The antitrust issues in such cases are similar to those in any cases of 
integration, namely, (l) whether the integration is reasonably nec-
essary to achieve the efficiencies, and (2) whether restraints flowing 
from the integration are truly necessary to achieve the integration. 
When both questions are answered affirmatively, it may safely be 
concluded that the procompetitive effects of the integration out-
weigh any resulting loss of competition. 
2. Otganization to reduce search costs. The amount and quality of 
information available about the market significantly affects search 
costs-the costs of knowing and evaluating the options the market 
96 See generally WILLIAMS001, MARKETS A01D HIERARCHIES: A01ALYSIS A01D A01TITRGST · 
!MPLICATI001S 20-40 (1975). 
97 E.g., MA01SFIELD, MICROEC0010MICS 2H-35 (2d ed. 1975). 
98 441 U.S. 1 (1979). See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra. 
99 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. H4 (1933); Webster County Memo-
rial Hospital, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund of 
1950, 536 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Compare Virginia Excelsior /VIills, Inc. v. FTC, 256 
F.2d 538 {4th Cir. 1958); United States v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 182 F. Supp. 834 
(S.D.N .Y. 1960). See also L.C.L. Theatres v. Columbia Pictures, Indus., 566 F.2d 494 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (collective surveillance of plaintiff's movie theater to check on alleged underreport-
ing of revenue is permissible). 
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provides. 100 Efficient amounts of appropriate information may not 
be generated by the market, however, without competitor collab-
oration or government intervention, because of the public goods 
characteristic of information, 101 and because persons will not want 
to divulge information without a promise that the recipients will 
reciprocate. As a result, in the absence of a restriction of output, 
numerous forms of restraint ancillary to information improvement 
are sanctioned by the antitrust laws-information exchanges 
among competitors, 102 organized trading exchanges, 103 and product 
testing and rating. 104 
The problem of search costs and the explanation of the way in 
which quality, safety, and ethical norms may promote efficiency105 
explain why the Court in Professional Engineers said that "[e]thical 
norms may se'rve to regulate and promote ... competition"106 and 
thus fall outside the per se rules. When it is costly for consumers to 
evaluate products, it is difficult for them to reward the products 
they like with higher prices; prices will reflect the average quality of 
all interchangeable products, both good and bad. As a result, the 
100 See Benham, Tbe Effect of Advertising on tbe Price of Eyeglasses, IS J.L. & EcoN. 337, 338 
(1972); Nelson, Itiformatioll and Consumer Bebavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970); Stigler, Tbe 
Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). 
101 Arrow, Economic Welfare and tbe Allocation of Resources for lnvmtion, in THERA TE AND 
DIRECTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 609 (1962); Posner, Information and Antitrust, 67 GEO. 
L.J. 1186, 1193 (I 979). 
101 Michelman v. Clark-Schwebel Fiber Glass Corp., 534 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 885 (1976) (exchanging information on plaintiff's creditworthiness is not unlawful 
where there is no incentive for joint action or uniform conduct); FTC Advisory Opinion 
(1969); 16 C.F.R. § 15:361 (1980) (permitting trade association credit reporting so long as 
each member makes own decision and certain protections are afforded). 
103 See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Danville Tobacco 
Ass'n v. Bryant-Buclmer Associates, Inc., 333 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1964) and 372 F.2d 634 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967); Mechanical Contractors Bid Depository v. Chris-
tiansen, 352 F.2d 817 (lOth Cir. 1965), cert. dmied, 384 U.S. 918 (1966); United States v. 
Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980). 
104 Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Foundation, 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 107 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 
1939); Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Ore. 
1966), aff'd per curiam, 399 F.2d ISS (9th Cir. 1968), cert. dmied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969). See 
Note, Promoting Product-Quality ltifonnation: A Proposed Limited Allfitrust Exemption for Produc-
ers, 30 STAN. L. REV. 563 (1978). 
105 See Leland, Quacks, Lemons and Licmsing: A Tbeory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J. 
POL. EcoN. 1328 (I 979); Ackerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertaillfy and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488 (1970); Oi, Tbe Economics of Product Safety, 4 BELL]. EcoN. 3 
(I 97 3). 
106 438 U.S. at 696. 
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incentive for any seller to improve the quality of his products is 
decreased and the incentive to take a free ride on the quality of 
other products is increased; that is, there will be underinvestment 
in product quality. -When competitors eliminate poor or unsafe 
products, the average price of products will rise (reflecting the 
increase in average quality), and the proper investment incentive 
will be restored. Under such circumstances, restraints of trade may 
promote consumer welfare by helping to overcome the effects of 
imperfect consumer knowledge. ' 
This is not an argument that quality or ethical norms always. 
increase efficiency and consumer welfare. Moreover, product 
norms may be inferior to other, more direct, means of overcoming 
the problem of insufficient consumer information. 107 But the pro-
mote side of the promote/suppress standard is broad enough to 
permit such sources of consumer welfare to be considered, and the 
reasonableness test is flexible enough to permit a court to determine 
whether the prerequisites of this argument have been met-
namely, whether the characteristics of the market (particularly the 
cost of consumer information) are such that oualitv and safetv 
--- ' J rl ./ 
norms are likely to increase -·welfare, \Vhether the norms as ar-
ticulated and applied limit only objectively unsafe and substandard 
products, and whether other means of overcoming consumer in-
formation problems-for example, disclosure requirements-are 
superior means of achieving the same end. 
3. Transaction costs and product standardization. Product standard-
ization is a particular form of competitor collaboration that may 
reduce transaction costs and thus promote competition. Establish-
ing and policing product grading standards, 108 for example, reduces 
a consumer's cost of evaluating products. Exchanging information 
about product specifications may reduce the cost of competitive 
imitation, an important source of consumer welfare. 109 Establishing 
standard sizes may facilitate handling. And establishing standard 
107 For example, disseminating product information to enable consumers to evaluate prod-
ucts may permit greater product differentiation and thus reward and encourage product 
improvement. Lunsford, Consumers and Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in the Market 
Place, 64 TRADEMARK REP. 75 (1974). 
108 See, e.g., Tropic Film Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1247, 1254 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (rating motion pictures not unreasonable). Cf Dept. of Justice, Business 
Review, Transportation Association of America, June 24, 1968 (standardizing terms of 
reference and tariff formats would enhance transportation competition). 
109 Cf Smith v. Chane!, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968) (accurately comparing copied 
product to original is not trademark infringement or unfair competition). 
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product characteristics may facilitate product interconnection, as 
when the circuitry of audio components is standardized, or inter-
changeability, so that, for example, replacement parts can be pur-
chased from any of a number of sellers. For these types of stan-
dardization, the risk of anticompetitive harm is small enough and 
the possibility of economic benefit great enough to support treat-
ment under the rule of reason. 
The Court's opinion in Catala11o, 110 in contrast, exposes the limits 
that have been placed on the product standardization argument. 
The Ninth Circuit's refusal to invalidate a horizontal agreement 
eliminating credit sales was based on its belief that the elimination 
of credit might be procompetitive, because it would channel rivalry 
away from nonprice competition and toward price competition by 
simplifying transactions and eliminating the "distraction" of non-
price terms. Although the Ninth Circuit's characterization of credit 
as a nonprice term is questionable, 111 the characterization issue is 
only a semantic quibble: the central issue is whether it is permis-
sible for competitors to channel competition toward one form 
rather than another. 
r'h ]' ' ' ' ' 1 .C .C ' J L v.1.aanne"'1ng compet1t1on 1nto part1cu ar 1orms Oi r1va1.ry, r1ow..:. 
ever, does not legitimately reduce transaction costs. The defen-
dants in Catala11o were not trying to give consumers more informa-
tion about the market. Their argument was that consumers and the 
market process would benefit if there were less information about 
credit terms, because consumers would then focus on information 
(about prices) that would be more to their advantage. This is not an 
argument that increasing the amount of information leads to trans-
actional efficiency, but that consumers should be protected from 
their own misuse of information generated by the market. 112 That 
argument is inconsistent with consumer welfare. When credit com-
petition is flourishing it is presumably because consumers have 
chosen credit rivalry over price rivalry. 113 If the consumer sover-
I !0 446 U.S. 643 (1980). 
111 See note 14 supra. 
112 In applying the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has rejected a similar protec-
tionist argument advanced to justify government restraints on commercial speech. Virginia 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769 
(1976}. 
113 If there were a free-rider problem in the provision of information, one could not be so 
confident that consumers get the information they really want; but no free-rider problem is · 
apparent in Catalm1o. 
344 iiHe SUPfli::ME COUP.i REVIEW [1982 
eignty underlying a market economy is to be preserved, that deci-
sion should be respected and protected. 114 
The distinction between legitimate product standardization and 
the "standardization" in Catalano is clear. The standardization in' 
Catalano was not to provide information to make competitive offer-
ings comparable. h was to make them comparable by homogeniz-
ing them, reducing them to simplified terms by eliminating some 
forms of competition. This, as the Supreme Court said, 115 is no 
different from homogenizing and simplifying transactions by agree-
ing to sell at a single price and was therefore correctly held to be per 
se unlawful. 
IV. MARICOPA: THE COURT STUMBLES 
Had the Supreme Court recognized the substantial doctrinal 
synthesis it achieved in its pre-Maricopa cases, it would have written 
a much different opinion in Maricopa. Its Maricopa opinion is retro-
gressive: it champions a wooden, mechanical view of the per se 
rules and fails to recognize the full range of circumstances in which 
trade restraints may promote competition. 
Maricopa involved an agreement in which nonaffiliated doctors 
established a maximum price schedule for services they provide 
patients insured by sponsoring insurance carriers. The plaintiff, 
the State of Arizona, moved for summary judgment, claiming that 
the maximum price fixing was a per se antitrust violation. The 
Ninth Circuit refused to apply a per se rule, noting that too little 
was known about either the effect of the agreement or the health 
care industry to permit the per se rule to be invoked. 116 
The Supreme Court, applying the per se rule to invalidate the 
agreement, reversed. Justice Stevens's opinion for the plurality 
paid little attention to the economic impact of the maximum price 
fixing in the context in which it was employed. Instead, the out-
1
,.. Thus, in Catalano, the Court rejected the argument that "nonprice" competition is less 
significant than price competition, just as it earlier rejected the argument that the nonprice 
competition induced by vertical nonprice restraints is less significant than price competition. 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56, n.25 (1977) (an argument 
"flawed by its necessary assumption that a large part of the promotional efforts resulting 
from vertical restrictions will not convey socially desirable information about P!1oduct avail-
ability, price, quality, and services"). 
11
; 446 U.S. at 649. 
116 643 F.2d 553, 556 (1980). 
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come rested largely on the longevity and procedural simplicity of 
the per se price-fixing rule. Thus, Justice Stevens stressed "the 
costs of judging business practices under the rule of reason" 117 and 
openly acknowledged the loss of fidelity when per se rules are 
applied: "For the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency, 
we have tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that a 
full blown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable. "118 These 
statements signal a retreat from the promote/suppress standard, 
because they imply that restraints that potentially promote compe-
tition may nonetheless be subject to the per se rules. The Court 
made that conclusion clear: "The anticompetitive potential inherent 
in all price-fixing agreements," said the Court, "justifies their facial 
invalidation even if procompetitive justifications are offered for 
some." 119 
Justice Stevens's emphasis on the certainty and automatic nature 
of the per se rules is a throwback to the worst aspects of Topco. 120 By 
implying that per se rules can be applied without considering pol-
icy implications whenever something called price fixing is ob-
served, the Court lost sight of the fundamental principle that it had 
recognized in the cases beP.veen Topco and Aifaricopa: neither the 
existence of the per se rules nor the certainty provided by the per se 
rules enables a court to determine whether to apply the per se rule. 
The decision to apply the per se rule can be made only after a court 
determines whether the reasons advanced to justify the restraint are 
the type of reasons that are acceptable under the promote/suppress 
standard, that is, whether the restraint possibiy promotes competi-
tion in one of the three ways described above. To ignore this princi-
ple undermines sound antitrust analysis by sacrificing fidelity for 
certainty. 121 
The Court was no doubt influenced by its belief that the per se 
117 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (1982). 
118 !d. 
119 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2477 (1982). 
120 See text accompanying notes 20-33 supra. 
121 Even more remarkable, perhaps, is Justice Stevens's notion, also dredged from Topco, 
see note 29 supra, that per se rules "enhance the legislative prerogative to amend the law," 
because they put the onus on Congress to create exceptions to the per se rules. 102 S. Ct. at 
2478. Congress, however, did not enact the per se rules; it enacted a statement of principle-
faith in efficiendy functioning markets-for the Court to apply. Congress should not be 
expected to remedy every derogation of that principle that results from a misapplication of 
per se rules. 
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rule against maximum price fixing is based on sound policy. The 
rule arose virtually without examination or explanation at a time 
when the Court geared its antitrust policy toward protecting the 
autonomy of businesses rather than toward identifying and protect-
ing business arrangements that promote efficiency. 122 The rule 
arose, moreover, in cases involving vertical price fixing, rather than 
the horizontal price fixing in Maricopa, so the rule's application in 
Maricopa need not have been automatic. 123 Even the Court's list of 
the potential anticompetitive dangers of maximum price fixing, 
which was an exaggeration, 124 could not excuse the Court from 
determining whether this maximum price fixing promoted or sup-
pressed competition. 
- When the -Court finally reluctantly considered the argument that 
maximum price fixing by these defendants promotes competition, 
its analysis was unsatisfactory. Professor Frank Easterbrook has 
explained how maximum price fixing in the context of Maricopa 
promotes competition by reducing the transaction costs of provid-
ing insured medical care. 125 Several factors account for high trans-
action costs. Because insurers find it difficult to predict the inci-
dence of illness and the cost of treatment, they find it difficult to 
estimate the medical care costs they must cover under their 
policies. As a result, their premiums are increased to reflect the risk 
that their estimates will be erroneous. The difficulty of predicting 
insurance payouts is exacerbated by the "moral hazard" problem 
typified by insurance: an insured person has no incentive to shop 
for low-cost services, because the insurer, not the insured, pays for 
the services. Although insurers have attempted to ameliorate the 
problem by agreeing to compensate insureds only for "usual, ordi-
nary, and customary" medical costs, that standard is difficult to 
apply. It also requires the insurer and the insured to incur the 
additional costs of determining which fees are "usual, ordinary, and 
122 E.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) 
(maximum price "agreements, no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom 
of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment"). 
In Maricopa the Court may have reverted to this mode of analysis by concluding that "hori-
zontal agreements to fix maximum prices [are] on the same legal-even if not economic-
footing as agreements to fix minimum or uniform prices." 102 S. Ct. at 2475. 
123 Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886, 887-90 (1981). 
12+ ld. at 900-908. 
125 ld. at 896-98 (1981). Contra, Kallstrom, Healtb Care Cost Control by Tbird Party Pa)'ors: 
Fee Scbedules, and tbe Sberman Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 645, 678-84. 
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customary." Moreover, both insurers and insureds find it difficult 
to evaluate the necessity for, and the quality of, medical care, 
which increases further the transaction costs of an efficient insur-
ance system. 
These problems of transaction cost are potentially ameliorated 
by the maximum price fixing utilized by the doctors in Maricopa. 
Because doctors who subscribe to the plan agree to a maximum fee 
for covered services, insurers are able to estimate more accurately 
their liability under their policies and thus reduce premiums. In-
sureds find the plan attractive, because they are guaranteed that 
their entire cost of service will be covered if they go to a doctor who 
subscribes to the plan. With respect to doctors, their maximum fee 
is fixed, so they have no incentive to inflate costs by providing more 
services than are required. Minimum quality standards are main-
tained by physician peer review groups, which check on the med-
ical necessity and appropriateness of treatment provided to in-
sureds.126 
The Court recognized the strength of these assertions, 127 but 
rejected them, because it found that the maximum fee schedule 
challenged in Maricopa originated with doctors rather than with an 
insurer, 128 as is the case with many other types of medical insur-
ance. The Court apparently viewed fee schedules originating with 
insurers to be a less restrictive, but reasonably substitutable, alter-
native to fee schedules originating with doctors. The Court was 
wrong. Doctors may be able to establish maximum prices more 
efficiently than insurers, because doctors have better information 
about the cost of various medical services and can more easily 
determine the maximum prices that will clear the market. If so, 
insurer-sponsored maximum price schedules are a more expensive, 
and hence less desirable, alternative to doctor-originated maximum 
price schedules. The Court recognized this possibility but gave it 
little weight, because the possibility was "far from obvious" and 
because any efficiencies from doctor-originated maximum fee 
126 The defendants' peer review function, which could be characterized as a form of group 
boycott, was not challenged in Maricopa. !02 S. Ct. 2466, 2471 (1982). 
127 The Court found it arguable "that the existence of a fee schedule, whether fixed by the 
doctors or by the insurers, makes it easier-and to that extent less expensive-for insurers to 
calculate the risks that they underwrite and to arrive at the appropriate reimbursement on 
insured claims." 102 S. Ct. at 2477 n. 25. 
128 !02 S. Ct. at 2477-78. 
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schedules might be offset by the "power of the [doctors] to dictate 
the terms of such insurance plans. " 129 
The Court's reasoning is inconsistent with sound antitrust analy-
sis. Because jVJaricopa came to the Court on plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment, there was no factual record, and the Court 
therefore could not determine whether doctors can establish max-
imum fee schedules more efficiently than insurers. The only issue 
appropriately before the Court was whether it is worth the cost to 
determine at trial the relative efficiency of doctor-originated max-
imum fee schedules or whether the relative efficiency of doctor-
originated fee schedules could be determined from theoretical anal-
ysis so as to avoid a trial. The Court refused to address that issue 
and instead hid behind the procedural fix of the per se rules to avoid 
the crucial issue. Similarly, the Court's concern that maximum 
price fixing may enable doctors to "dictate the terms of insurance 
policies" raises a factual issue that the Court could not appropri-
ately address in reviewing a motion for summary judgment. Al-
though the conspiring doctors in Maricopa comprised seventy 
percent of the doctors in the relevant market, 130 which made it 
legitimate to question their market po\ver, that is no justification for 
• 1. 1 ' 1 1 .1 .. 1 
mvoiong a per se ruie, Decause tne per se rliie assumes rnar me 
maximum price fixing would be unlawful whatever the market 
power of the defendants. 
The Court should have acknowledged that the maximum price 
fixing by these doctors might promote competition by facilitating 
insured medical care, and it should have then identified the factual 
issues raised by that possibility and openly considered whether an 
accurate determination of the issues required a trial or whether, 
given the cost of a trial, an acceptably accurate answer could be 
given through economic analysis. The Court's approach-avoiding 
legitimate factual issues in order to shoehorn this case into a per se 
rule meant for other contexts-only subverts antitrust analysis. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
One of the enduring legacies of the Chicago school of anti-
trust analysis is the identification of a coherent, unified, and consis-
129 102 S. Ct. at 2478. 
130 102 S. Ct. at 2470. 
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tent framework for analyzing antitrust issues. Prior to Maricopa, the 
Supreme Court appeared to be using that framework in its own 
analysis. The Court's performance in antitrust cases would im-
prove if it continued to do so. 
Antitrust analysis would be improved substantially if the Court 
would interpret the promote/suppress standard using the consumer 
welfare model; that is, if it would examine restraints of trade to 
determine whether they improve productive or allocative effi-
ciency. Under this approach, the per se rules would cease to be 
viewed as easily applied rules designed to simplify antitrust analy-
sis. Rather, per se rules would be viewed as substantive rules, to be 
applied when analysis shows that conduct is unable to improve 
productive or allocative efficiency or that it is costly to determine 
the efficiency effects of conduct. This approach would not gut the 
per se rules. Collaboration between nonintegrated competitors that 
has no possibility of increasing productive or allocative efficiency 
can be recognized easily; conduct that is now properly subject to 
per se rules would continue to be subject to per se rules, and just as 
decisively. 
At the same time, rational analysis of conduct that might increase 
rr · 1 , 1 • 1 ...... • • . 1- . . 1 emciency wou a De improvea. Kecogmzmg tuat me per se category 
is separated from the rule of reason category because of the poten-
tial for some conduct to promote efficiency, shows the unity of 
antitrust analysis and focuses attention on the substantive criteria 
that really matter in evaluating conduct. Moreover, adopting the 
consumer welfare model would require courts to consider more 
carefully the efficiency-producing properties of conduct and would 
thus enliven antitrust analysis with new substantive vigor. 
